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In 1999, Congress passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act (ACPA) to combat “cybersquatters” who profited by registering
domain names that were confusingly similar to established trademarks.
Under the ACPA, trademark owners have a specific cause of action
against domain name registrants accused of cybersquatting. Moreover,
the law gives U.S. courts in rem jurisdiction over trademark infringing
domain names registered to parties that are not subject to personal
jurisdiction. Over the past decade, proceeding in rem against domain
names has proven to be an effective strategy for trademark owners.
While many companies have used the ACPA against cybersquatters,
others have relied on the in rem provision to secure domain names
registered to foreign companies that happen to use a similar mark for
their goods or services. From a policy perspective, this latter practice
is troubling because it allows district courts to determine whether for-
eign companies can use their marks as domain names, even if these
companies lack minimum contacts with the court’s forum. To prevent
such overreach, courts should limit the ACPA’s in rem jurisdiction to
domain names that were registered in a bad faith attempt to profit from
another’s trademark.
INTRODUCTION
In 2013, Google launched dozens of balloons into the air.1  Each balloon
was equipped with antennas that broadcasted wireless Internet signals to the
ground below.2  The goal is to provide Internet access to places beyond the
* J.D. Candidate 2014. I am very grateful to Professor Jessica Litman, who first
inspired me to write about this topic and provided invaluable guidance through the completion
of this Note.  I would also like to thank the MTTLR Executive Board, especially Helen Ji,
Carlyn Williams and Micah Siegel-Wallace.
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reach of conventional telecommunication infrastructure.3 If this project is
ultimately successful, individuals in remote rural areas can type
“google.com” to access the same web portal that Internet users throughout
the world have used for years.  This is because “google.com” is a part of the
domain name system (DNS) and serves as a singular identifier for the ubiq-
uitous search engine regardless of where the user is located—a feature
known as universal resolvability.4  Over the past few decades, this function
of the DNS has helped create a largely borderless Internet,5 which has in turn
fundamentally transformed communication and revolutionized global con-
nectivity.6  While the Internet and DNS matured without much regard to
geography, the rule of law has always been constrained by state and national
borders.7  As such, universal resolvability often clashed with a set of juris-
dictional principles that are still deeply rooted in territorialism. Faced with
this tension, courts have often struggled to determine the proper scope of
jurisdiction over the DNS.
Historically, jurisdiction was based on physical presence.8  For example,
in the traditional framework, a person domiciled in the state of Michigan
was subject to Michigan’s laws, as was his in–state property. Long before
the advent of the Internet, this framework first began to buckle under the
weight of an increasingly national economy.  By the early twentieth century,
the railroad and the automobile had revolutionized individual mobility and
commercial operations, and the strictly territorial approach to jurisdiction
seemed increasingly under–inclusive as a result.9  The Supreme Court fi-
nally responded to the new national landscape by adopting a more flexible
approach to jurisdiction in International Shoe v. Washington.10  In Interna-
tional Shoe, the Court articulated a set of important principles underlying
3. Id.
4. How to Get Online: How the Domain Name System Works, VERISIGN, http://www.
verisigninc.com/en_US/why-verisign/education-resources/how-dns-works/index.xhtml?cmp=
SEMG02:03 (last visited Nov. 17, 2013); The Domain Name System: A Non-Technical Expla-
nation – Why Universal Resolvability Is Important, INTERNIC, http://www.internic.net/faqs/
authoritative-dns.html (last accessed Nov. 24, 2013).
5. Id.
6. James Manyika & Charles Roxburgh, The Great Transformer: The Impact of the
Internet on Economic Growth and Prosperity, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Oct. 2011), http://
www.mckinsey.com/insights/high_tech_telecoms_internet/the_great_transformer.
7. See, e.g., Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (“[T]he
general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”).
8. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
9. See Kimberley Dayton, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce, 7 REV.
LITIG. 239, 247 n.27 (1988) (describing how courts used the consent theory to circumvent the
territoriality requirements of Pennoyer).
10. Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326
U.S. 310, 321-22 (1945); see also J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789
(2011).
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any exercise of jurisdiction,11 the most important of which is that personal
jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice.12
As the Internet reshapes the economy, the flexible standard of Interna-
tional Shoe has proved increasingly difficult to apply to the virtual world,
and courts have struggled to develop a single coherent test for online juris-
diction.13  This difficulty is especially apparent in the regulation of the DNS,
where companies with similar or identical names compete to register their
names.  Moreover, some individuals purposefully register domain names
containing trademarks they do not own in order to sell the domain names
back to the trademark owners or purposely mislead consumers.14 These prac-
tices are known as “cybersquatting.”15  To protect trademark owners against
such exploitation, U.S. courts will frequently exercise jurisdiction over
trademark infringing domain names, including those owned by foreign par-
ties and targeted at foreign web users.16
In particular, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA)
grants in rem jurisdiction over a domain name to the jurisdiction where the
domain name’s registry or registrar is located.17  With the ACPA, trademark
owners can proceed ex parte against domain names, even if they cannot
obtain personal jurisdiction over the domain name registrant.18  For example,
if a hypothetical family store in India named “Macy’s” decided to launch a
website under the domain “macys–store.com,” the U.S. department store
also named “Macy’s” could seek ex parte cancellation of the domain name.19
In this hypothetical case, a U.S. court sitting where “macys–store.com” is
registered would have jurisdiction over the domain name—even if the In-
dian store does no business in the U.S. and the U.S. store has no trademark
rights in India.
11. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
(due process limits on jurisdiction “gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that
allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct”); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 207 (1977).
12. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207 (1977) (“The case for applying to jurisdiction in rem the
same test of ‘fair play and substantial justice’ as governs assertions of jurisdiction in personam
is simple and straightforward. It is premised on recognition that ‘(t)he phrase, ‘judicial juris-
diction over a thing’, is a customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the interests
of persons in a thing.’”).
13. Erin F. Norris, Note, Why the Internet Isn’t Special: Restoring Predictability to
Personal Jurisdiction, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1013, 1023 (2011).
14. Thomas R. Lee, In Rem Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 75 WASH. L. REV. 97, 104
(2000).
15. Id.
16. Cable News Network, LP v. CNNews.com, 56 F. App’x 599, 603 (4th Cir. 2003).
17. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 3002, 113
Stat. 1501, 1501A–547 (1999)
18. Id.
19. Cf. Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 2002)
(exercising in rem jurisdiction over sixty domain names that infringe the British department
store Harrods’s trademark).
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While this exercise of jurisdiction may comport with the constitutional
standard for in rem proceedings against traditional property, such ex parte
actions against domain names undermine important policy principles behind
limits on jurisdiction. These broad assertions of jurisdiction invade the prov-
ince of foreign national sovereignty, undermine the ability of parties to
structure their conduct in accordance with their legal obligations, and create
procedural unfairness for foreign parties. To address this concern, this Note
argues that, rather than canceling any foreign domain name that violates
U.S. trademark laws, courts should only exert in rem jurisdiction over do-
main names that were registered in a bad faith attempt to profit from an-
other’s trademark. Imposing this bad faith requirement would not only
support rational policy interests, but would also be more consistent with the
language and purpose of the ACPA.
The remainder of this Note is organized in five parts. Part I provides a
brief background of jurisdiction in the United States and explains important
policy justifications behind limits on jurisdiction. Part II examines the archi-
tecture of the DNS and the legal status of domain names. Part III introduces
the problem of cybersquatting and describes how trademark owners have
used the ACPA to combat this practice. This part will also discuss the con-
stitutionality of in rem actions under the ACPA as well as whether in rem
jurisdiction should be limited to domain names registered in bad faith.  Part
IV explains why in rem actions under the ACPA violate important policies
for jurisdictional limits, even if they comport with the current standard for
due process. Finally, Part V argues that courts should be required to find that
a domain name was registered in bad faith before it can exercise in rem
jurisdiction.
I. PRINCIPLES OF JURISDICTION
A core tenet of law is that a court must have jurisdiction over a dispute
before it can render a valid judgment.20  Without jurisdiction, any decision
“is a mere nullity, and incapable of binding such persons or property in any
other tribunals.”21  Jurisdiction comes in several flavors.  First, a court must
be able to hear the specific kind of claim that is brought before it.22  This is
known as subject matter jurisdiction.23  Second, the court must have power
over the parties involved or the property in dispute.24  Individuals are subject
to personal jurisdiction, while property is subject to in rem jurisdiction.25
20. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1877) (citing Story, Confl. Laws, c. 2;
Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 2, c. 2).
21. Id.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 (1982).
23. Id. § 11 cmt. a.
24. Id. § 5-6.
25. Id.
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Taken together, these rules protect important systemic and individual
interests.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In the U.S., the federal system divides subject matter jurisdiction be-
tween the state and national government.26  State courts have general juris-
diction, which allows them to “adjudicate any justiciable controversy that is
not exclusively consigned to some other tribunal.”27  Federal courts, on the
other hand, are courts of restricted jurisdiction.28  By statute, federal courts
can only adjudicate claims that arise under the Constitution, federal laws,
international treaties, and those cases that meet diversity jurisdiction
requirements.29
On the international level, subject matter jurisdiction is still based on
territoriality.  There are a variety of circumstances that will give a domestic
court jurisdiction over an international dispute. For example, a court in any
country has jurisdiction over conduct that occurs in its territory, persons and
property within its borders, or extraterritorial conduct that has a substantial
effect in its territory.30  The last basis of international jurisdiction, known as
the effects doctrine, can give courts considerable power over foreign conduct
and often creates international tension.31  For example, in Alcoa v. Aluminum
Co. of America, the Second Circuit held that a foreign company was subject
to U.S. antitrust laws because their overseas conduct had intended effects on
the U.S. aluminum market.32  Likewise, in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., the
Supreme Court upheld an injunction against the sale of counterfeit Bulova
watches in Mexico because the trademark infringement would affect U.S.
commerce.33  Both cases demonstrate the breadth of jurisdiction under the
effects doctrine, as the courts adjudicated disputes in which the relevant par-
ties and alleged conduct were entirely foreign.
B. In personam Jurisdiction
Historically, the concept of personal jurisdiction was also firmly rooted
in principles of territoriality. States, as quasi–sovereign entities, could not
exert power over parties beyond their borders.34  As industry and technology
26. Id. § 11 cmt. a.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (2012).
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987).
31. Kun Young Chang, Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need
for the Clear and Restrained Scope of Extraterritorial Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, 9 FORD-
HAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 94, 100-01 (2003).
32. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945).
33. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
34. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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evolved in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, courts increasingly found
that territorial limits unduly constrained their ability to regulate interstate
companies.35  In 1945, the Supreme Court formally abandoned the principle
of strict territoriality in International Shoe v. Washington, and instead held
that courts may extend personal jurisdiction to anyone with “certain mini-
mum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”36
Over the next decades, courts struggled to make sense of this “minimum
contacts” requirement.  In the modern era, courts require defendants to have
purposefully availed themselves of the privileges of doing business in the
forum state in order to satisfy the minimum contacts test.37  For example, in
1980, the Supreme Court held in World–Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson that a
state did not have jurisdiction over a manufacturer simply because its prod-
ucts might foreseeably be used in that state.38  In that case, a plaintiff was
injured in Oklahoma while driving a car he purchased in New York.39  The
Oklahoma court found jurisdiction over the New York automobile distribu-
tors because they sold products that were “by [their] design and purpose so
mobile that [defendants could] foresee [their] possible use in Oklahoma.”40
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that foreseeability is not enough for
jurisdiction.41  Instead, jurisdiction requires that “defendant’s conduct and
connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there.”42
In 2011, the Court reaffirmed the World–Wide Volkswagen principles in
J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, where it held that a foreign manufacturer
could not be haled into a New Jersey court to face a product liability law-
suit.43  There, a worker in New Jersey was injured by a metal shearing ma-
chine manufactured by J. McIntyre Machinery, an English company.44  J.
MacIntyre argued that it was not subject to New Jersey’s jurisdiction be-
cause only four of its machines were in New Jersey, and a third–party dis-
tributor sold those machines.45  The Court accepted this argument, and held
that J. McIntyre did not “engage in any activities in New Jersey that re-
veal[ed] intent to invoke or benefit from the protection of its laws.”46  In so
35. See Dayton, supra note 9, at 247 n.27.
36. Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
37. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
38. Id. at 299.
39. Id. at 287.
40. Id. at 290 (citation omitted).
41. Id. at 295-96.
42. Id. at 297.
43. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791 (2011).
44. Id. at 2786.
45. Id. at 2790.
46. Id. at 2791.
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holding, Justice Kennedy emphasized that personal jurisdiction requires a
“sovereign–by–sovereign” analysis, and framed the question as “whether a
defendant has followed a course of conduct directed at the [ . . . ] given
sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to subject the defendant to
judgment concerning that conduct.”47
C. Power Over Property: in rem Jurisdiction and quasi–in–rem
Jurisdiction
Apart from jurisdiction over individuals and parties, courts may also
proceed against property through in rem jurisdiction.48  This form of juris-
diction is often described as the “determination of title to or the status of
property located—physically or legally—within the court’s jurisdiction.”49
Unlike actions in personam, jurisdiction in rem is still constrained to the
territorial restrictions of Pennoyer v. Neff.50 In other words, a court can exert
power over property in its borders, but cannot reach extraterritorial property.
There are two types of in rem jurisdiction: true in rem jurisdiction and
quasi–in–rem jurisdiction.51  True in rem jurisdiction determines all claims
that anyone in the world may have to the property in question, whereas
quasi–in–rem jurisdiction determines claims to the property in question be-
tween identifiable parties.52  For instance, a court exercising true in rem ju-
risdiction over real property can clear all title to the land, regardless of who
the claimant is.53  By contrast, a court that is partitioning land between two
individuals is exercising quasi–in–rem jurisdiction because it is adjudicating
the claims of specific parties.54
Examples of true in rem proceedings include admiralty liens, civil for-
feiture, title clearance or registration, and estate settlements.55  Of these pro-
ceedings, civil forfeiture has become an increasingly prominent—and
controversial—tool for federal law enforcement over the past decades.56
Under this doctrine, the state can seize property used to commit a crime even
47. Id. at 2789.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 30 (1982).
49. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1070 (3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
50. Id.; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (holding that a state’s exercise of jurisdic-
tion is based on territoriality).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 6 (1982).
52. Id. at cmt. a.
53. Id. at cmt. b.
54. Holly S. Haskew, Comment, Shaffer, Burnham, and New York’s Continuing Use of
Qir-2 Jurisdiction: A Resurrection of the Power Theory, 45 EMORY L.J. 239, 239 (1996).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 30 cmt. a (1982).
56. See, e.g., Alan Nicgorski, Comment, The Continuing Saga of Civil Forfeiture, the
“War on Drugs,” and the Constitution: Determining the Constitutional Excessiveness of Civil
Forfeitures, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 374, 376 (1996).
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if the property’s owner is innocent.57  First deployed in the 1970s for the
War on Drugs, civil forfeiture has now emerged as the signature weapon in
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment’s (ICE) crackdown on foreign–owned domain names.58
In quasi–in–rem jurisdiction, the underlying dispute may involve the
property itself or could be entirely unrelated to the property.59  In the latter
scenario, the court is essentially attaching the defendant’s property as a
proxy for in personam jurisdiction.60  As such, quasi–in–rem jurisdiction
seemed to allow courts to skip minimum contacts analysis when the defen-
dant had property located in the forum.  Responding to this incongruity, the
Supreme Court greatly curtailed quasi–in–rem jurisdiction in Shaffer v.
Heitner.61  There, the Court held that any exercise of quasi–in–rem jurisdic-
tion must also comport with the minimum contacts test.62  In Shaffer, the
Delaware Chancery Court exercised jurisdiction over corporate directors by
sequestering their stocks in a Delaware corporation.63  However, the under-
lying dispute involved activities that took place entirely in Oregon, and the
directors had no significant contacts with Delaware other than the presence
of their shares.64  In rejecting Delaware’s exercise of jurisdiction, the Su-
preme Court emphasized that “all assertions of state court jurisdiction must
be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and
its progeny.”65  In other words, courts are not free to ignore the minimum
contacts test simply because the defendant owns property in their
jurisdiction.66
Even after Shaffer, courts can continue to exercise quasi–in–rem juris-
diction when the underlying dispute involves the property itself.67 Unlike in
Shaffer, where the lawsuit was unrelated to the sequestered stocks, claims
against property have a closer relationship with the state where the property
is located.68  As Justice Marshall stated in Shaffer: “when claims to the prop-
57. Astol Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974)
(“[T]he innocence of the owner of property subject to forfeiture has almost uniformly been
rejected as a defense.”).
58. See, e.g., D.J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs:
Lessons from Economics and History, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 79 (1996); Karen Kopel,
Operation Seizing Our Sites: How the Federal Government Is Taking Domain Names Without
Prior Notice, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 859, 863 (2013).
59. The former is often referred to as quasi-in-rem type 1, whereas the latter is known
as quasi-in-rem type 2. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 49, § 1072.
60. Id.; see also Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
61. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
62. Id. at 212.
63. Id. at 192-93.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 212.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 207-208.
68. Id.
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erty itself are the source of the underlying controversy . . . it would be unu-
sual for the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction.”69
D. Policy Rationales for Jurisdictional Limits
Although limits on jurisdiction have evolved significantly over the past
century and still remain somewhat unsettled,70 courts have emphasized a set
of basic policy considerations present in any exercise of jurisdiction.71 Most
importantly, limits on jurisdiction (1) further systemic interests by weighing
federalism and sovereignty interests and (2) protect individual interests such
as procedural fairness and liberty interests.72
1. Limits on Jurisdiction Further Systemic Interests
Limitations on jurisdiction play an important role in furthering systemic
interests by maintaining federalism, preventing encroachment on foreign na-
tional sovereignty, and promoting international comity.73 As one commenta-
tor concisely stated, “[j]urisdictional rules are fundamental because they
describe community expectations about the reach of sovereign power.”74
Such systemic interests do more than provide theoretical justification for
jurisdictional limits—they serve important practical functions as well. On
the international level, perceived encroachment on national sovereignty can
lead nations to adopt blocking statutes that hamper international comity and
cooperation.75  For example, courts have read U.S. antitrust laws to grant
jurisdiction over any anticompetitive activity that substantially affects U.S.
commerce, even if the alleged activities takes place entirely abroad.76 This
69. Id.
70. Calder v. Jones is one example of an alternative approach, where the court found
that jurisdiction was proper because the alleged tortious conduct was intended to cause effects
in the forum state. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
71. Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoreti-
cal Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112, 1113-14 (1981).
72. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980)
(“The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related, but distin-
guishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or
inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States through their courts, do not reach out
beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”);
Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310,
319 (1945).
73. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011); Harold
G. Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 579, 584-
85 (1983).
74. Maier, supra note 73, at 580-81.
75. Chang, supra note 31, at 101.
76. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 795 (1993); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945). But see F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd.
v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (holding that U.S. courts do not have jurisdiction
under the Sherman Act in a case where the plaintiff’s claims are solely based on foreign harm
caused by foreign conduct).
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exercise of U.S. jurisdiction has been a source of consternation in U.S. for-
eign relations throughout the twentieth century.77  For example, during a
U.S. inquiry into alleged uranium price-fixing by a foreign cartel in the
1970s, the U.K. barred the U.S. Department of Justice’s attempt to investi-
gate several companies in Great Britain that allegedly participated in the
conspiracy.78  In that case, the U.K.’s Attorney General convinced the House
of Lords that “the wide investigatory procedures under the United States . . .
legislation . . . constitute an infringement of the proper jurisdiction and sov-
ereignty of the United Kingdom.”79  In addition to clashing with the U.K,
this investigation also prompted Australia, where several of the alleged con-
spirators were based, to pass legislation blocking evidence production in
cases that affect Australian national interest.80  Such legislation makes inter-
national cooperation more difficult,81 as well as hampers private litigation by
decreasing access to evidence and creating an unfair playing field between
domestic and foreign litigants.82
2. Limits on Jurisdiction Protect Individual Liberty Interests and
Procedural Fairness
In addition to furthering systemic interests, limits on jurisdiction also
protect party expectations and avoid the creation of incompatible legal obli-
gations for litigants.83  As the Court stated in Insurance Corporation of Ire-
land v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, “[t]he personal jurisdiction
requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest.”84
Most importantly, jurisdictional limits prevent burdensome and unfore-
seeable litigation.  This is especially pertinent for foreign litigants, who may
be compelled to litigate in a distant and unfamiliar court.  The Supreme
Court put significant weight on this issue in Asahi Metal Industry v. Supe-
rior Court of California.85  There, the Court held that California did not have
jurisdiction over a Japanese supplier of a tire component that caused an acci-
77. See David Lord Hacking, The Increasing Extraterritorial Impact of U.S. Laws: A
Cause for Concern Amongst Friends of America, 1 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1 (1979).
78. M.A. Blythe, Comment, Extraterritorial Impact of the Anti-Trust Laws: Protecting
British Trading Interests, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 99, 115 (1983); Laurence W. Maher, Antitrust
Fall-out: Tensions in the Australian-American Relationship, 13 FED. L. REV. 105, 105-07
(1982).
79. Blythe, supra note 78, at 115.
80. Maher, supra note 78, at 107.
81. See e.g., Mark J. Sadoff, Hague Evidence Convention: Problems at Home of Ob-
taining Foreign Evidence, 20 INT’L LAW. 659 (1986).
82. Note, Reassessment of International Application of Antitrust Laws: Blocking Stat-
utes, Balancing Tests, and Treble Damages, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 212 (1987).
83. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980).
84. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982).
85. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 114-116 (1987).
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dent in California.86 Asahi started as a products liability case, but ultimately
turned on an indemnity clause between the Japanese supplier and a
Taiwanese manufacturer.87  In opposing California’s exercise of jurisdiction,
the Japanese supplier protested that it “ha[d] never contemplated that its lim-
ited sales [of components] to [a manufacturer] in Taiwan would subject it to
lawsuits in California.”88  The Court sided with the Japanese supplier, and
found that it would be a significant burden for the defendant to “not only to
traverse the distance between . . . Japan and . . . [California], but also to
submit its dispute with [the plaintiff] to a foreign nation’s judicial system.”89
Likewise, the Court recognized that “the unique burdens placed upon one
who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant
weight in assessing the reasonableness” of extraterritorial jurisdiction.90
In addition, over–extensive jurisdiction over foreign entities can create
inconsistent, and occasionally incompatible, legal obligations.91 United
States v. Imperial Chemical Industries is a notable example of this prob-
lem.92  There, the district court, exercising jurisdiction under the effects doc-
trine, found that Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), an English company,
violated U.S. law through its patent licensing practices and ordered ICI to
assign certain patents to DuPont.93  This assignment, however, would have
violated a prior license agreement with another English company.94  In light
of ICI’s untenable position, the English court blocked enforcement of the
U.S. order, and ordered the company to uphold its prior license agreement.95
Over the long term, clear limitations on jurisdiction help foster a stable
and predictable environment for commercial activity.96  Businesses need to
know their legal obligations in order to plan ahead and make rational deci-
sions. This becomes more difficult when managers are uncertain as to which
sets of laws they are subject.  Jurisdiction limitations imposed by “the Due
Process Clause . . . give[ ] a degree of predictability to the legal system that
allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some
86. Id.
87. Id. at 106.
88. Id. at 107.
89. Id. at 114.
90. Id. at 103.
91. United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Kenneth
R. Feinberg, Economic Coercion and Economic Sanctions: The Expansion of United States
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 335 (1981).
92. Imperial Chem., 105 F. Supp. 215.
93. Id. at 228.
94. P. CAPPS, M.D. EVANS, S.V. KONSTADINIDIS, Asserting Jurisdiction: International
and European Legal Perspectives 112 (Patrick Capps et al. eds., 2003).
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980);
Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310,
319 (1945) (emphasizing that limits on personal jurisdiction ensure the “orderly administration
of laws”).
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minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them
liable to suit.”97 Without such limits, it would be difficult for businesses and
individuals to operate with knowledge of their legal duties, thus creating
unpredictability and inefficiency.
Although the national and global economy has changed dramatically
since International Shoe, the legal and policy justifications behind minimum
contacts and jurisdictional limits remain relevant. Even as commerce be-
comes increasingly electronic, businesses and individuals still need to dis-
cern their legal obligations and plan accordingly.  Within the new global
economy, the Internet has become one of the primary drivers of economic
growth.98 Companies increasingly reach their customers online, and their
virtual presence is often as important as their physical locations, if not more
so. In order for individuals and businesses to structure their conduct in ac-
cordance with their legal obligations, they must be aware of where they
could be liable for suit for their online activities. Likewise, globalization has
not washed away traditional borders entirely, so respect for national sover-
eignty continues to demand reasonable limits on extraterritorial jurisdiction.
As such, it is important for courts and legislators to carefully apply jurisdic-
tional limits to the Internet and its core components, including the DNS.
II. THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM
Since its humble beginnings as a simple way to look up network ad-
dresses, the Domain Name System (DNS) has evolved into the primary gate-
way for the Internet. VeriSign, one of the largest domain name registries on
the Internet, estimated that there were over 252 million total registered do-
main names at the end of 2012.99  Individual domain names can have enor-
mous social and commercial value.  For example, “investing.com” sold for
2.45 million dollars in 2012.100  Despite being such an important part of the
global economy, the legal rights associated with domain names have proven
difficult to characterize, and this lack of clarity has created considerable risk
and uncertainty for companies and individuals.101  To understand why it is
difficult to apply traditional legal theories to the DNS, this part first explains
the architecture of the DNS and then examines the legal status of domain
names as a form of property.
97. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
98. J. Manyika & C. Roxburgh, supra note 6.
99. VeriSign, The Domain Name Industry Brief, 10 VERISIGN DOMAIN REP. 1, 2 (2013),
available at http://www.verisigninc.com/assets/domain-name-brief-april2013.pdf.
100. Heather R. Huhman, Investing.com Domain Purchased for an Historic $2.45 Mil-
lion, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 11, 2012 3:38 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/investingcom-
domain-purchased-for-an-historic-245-million-2012-12.
101. Norris, supra note 13 at 1023 (“These varying approaches [to jurisdiction over the
Internet] have left the doctrine in a tangled and unpredictable state.”).
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A. The DNS Architecture
The Internet is commonly defined as a network of electronic devices
that use the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) to
transmit and exchange data.102  Each device on this network is identified by
an Internet Protocol (IP) number, which is a set of binary numbers that indi-
cates the network address of the device.103 In order for one device to send
data to another device, the sender must have the IP address of the receiving
device.104  For example, if a personal computer is trying to access a webpage
on a server, the personal computer must have the IP address of the
webpage’s server.
The obvious way to access a website is to manually enter the IP address
of its server, much like dialing a phone number. However, early in the In-
ternet’s history, its architects recognized that numeric strings are difficult to
remember and enter.105  To solve this problem, computer scientists set up a
directory that matched English language names with network addresses.106
This way, users could look up the English language name on the directory,
which would direct computers to the correct network address.  In this early
system, a copy of the directory was locally stored on every networked com-
puter.107  As such, each local directory file had to be updated whenever a
network address was changed or added, making the system difficult to man-
age and scale up.108 In response to these shortfalls, researchers proposed a
hierarchal distributed system of directories.109  Instead of using lo-
cally–saved directories, the proposed system would store directories on mul-
tiple remote servers.110  Networked computers would access the remote
directory to match names with IP addresses, thus eliminating the need to
update a local file on every computer. This system eventually evolved into
the modern DNS.
Concisely stated, the DNS allows users to access websites by entering a
domain name instead of an IP address.111  The DNS naming convention uses
a series of characters separated by the “.” sign.112  The characters after the
102. Definition of Internet, The Networking and Information Technology Research and
Development Program, http://www.nitrd.gov/fnc/Internet_res.aspx (last visited Nov. 16,
2013).
103. TIMOTHY ROONEY, INTRODUCTION TO IP ADDRESS MANAGEMENT 2 (2010).
104. Id.
105. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
BOARD, SIGNPOSTS IN CYBERSPACE: THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM AND INTERNET NAVIGATION
40 (2005).
106. Id. at 39-40.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 40.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 34.
112. About gTLDs, INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES & NUMBERS, http://
www.icann.org/en/resources/registries/about (last visited Nov. 16, 2013).
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last “.” correspond to the top–level domain (TLD).113  The characters imme-
diately preceding the last “.” correspond to the second–level domain
(SLD).114 For example, in the domain name “umich.edu,” the TLD is “.edu,”
while the SLD is “umich.”  Domain names may have further subdomains
that designate a particular division of a website.  For example, in the domain
name “law.umich.edu,” the term “law” is a subdomain of “umich.”
As mentioned earlier, the DNS is hierarchal.  At the top of the hierarchy,
there is a “root file” that serves as a directory for TLDs.115  The “root file” is
stored on hundreds of root servers around the world, and is maintained by
the Internet Assigned Names Authority.116 Under the root file, registry serv-
ers manage all domain names ending with any particular TLD.117  For exam-
ple, VeriSign, Inc., is the registry for all domain names that end in “.com.”118
Finally, the registries generally contract with registrars, which sell individual
domain names to members of the public.119
B. Legal Status of Domain Names
When disputes about domain name ownership inevitably arise, most
courts have treated domain names as a form of property.120  For example, in
Kremen v. Cohen, the Ninth Circuit held that domain names are property
because they represent a well–defined interest capable of exclusive con-
trol.121  There, the court noted “registering a domain name is like staking a
claim to a plot of land at the title office. It informs others that the domain
name is the registrant’s and no one else’s.”122
Academic commentators have been quick to point out problems in this
logic.123  If registering a domain name is truly analogous to staking a claim
to land, then individuals who speculate on domain names containing trade-
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Root Servers, INTERNET ASSIGNED NUMBERS AUTHORITY, http://www.iana.org/do-
mains/root/servers (last visited Nov. 16, 2013).
116. Id.
117. What Does ICANN Do?, INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES & NUMBERS, http://
icann.org/en/participate/what-icann-do.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2010).
118. Fact Sheet, VERISIGN, http://www.verisigninc.com/en_US/company-information/
about-verisign/fact-sheet/index.xhtml (last visited Nov. 16, 2013).
119. Scott P. Sonbuchner, Note, Master of Your Domain: Should the U.S. Government
Maintain Control over the Internet’s Root?, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 183, 186 (2008).
120. Daniel Hancock, You Can Have It, but Can You Hold It?: Treating Domain Names
As Tangible Property, 99 KY. L.J. 185, 194 (2011).
121. Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003); but see In re Alexandria
Surveys Int’l, 500 B.R. 817, 821-22 (E.D. Va. 2013) (holding that, in the context of a bank-
ruptcy dispute, a domain name is a contractual right instead of a property right).
122. Id.
123. Jacqueline D. Lipton, Bad Faith in Cyberspace: Grounding Domain Name Theory
in Trademark, Property, and Restitution, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 447, 454 (2010).
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marks should have a property right in those names.124  However, such regis-
trants cannot keep their domain name if they do not own the trademark.125
The reason is, as one scholar explains, that “a trademark holder has some
rights in a domain name corresponding with her mark as a matter of trade-
mark policy.  A real property holder, on the other hand, has no pre–existing
rights in adjacent land.”126
Despite any conceptual hurdles to classifying domain names as prop-
erty, this characterization allows courts to exert in rem jurisdiction over do-
main names based on where the domain names are registered.127 Proceedings
in rem give private parties and government agencies powerful weapons to
enforce intellectual property rights. For trademark owners, in rem jurisdic-
tion allows for ex parte proceedings against domain names, thus eliminating
the need for personal jurisdiction over the registrant.128 Similarly, character-
izing domain names as property subjects them to civil forfeiture; a tactic
used by the DOJ and ICE to seize hundreds of domain names.129
The remainder of this Note will focus on in rem jurisdiction over do-
main names, and examines whether such jurisdiction supports the policy ra-
tionales previously discussed. Under the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act (ACPA), trademark owners can proceed in rem against a do-
main name if the name infringes or dilutes a valid trademark.130  Although
such proceedings do not violate the due process standard set by International
Shoe and its progeny, this exercise of jurisdiction is inconsistent with basic
rationales for limiting jurisdiction.  Moreover, exercising in rem jurisdiction
over domain names that were not registered in bad faith also violates the
spirit and text of the ACPA.
III. IN REM JURISDICTION UNDER THE ACPA
The ACPA is an amendment to § 43 of the Lanham Act, and constitutes
the key legislation that regulates domain name disputes in the United
States.131  Under the ACPA, “a person shall be liable in a civil action by the
owner of a mark . . . if . . . that person” registers, traffics, or uses a domain
name that is confusingly similar or likely dilutive of the owner’s mark and
does so in bad faith.132  Moreover, the ACPA also gives trademark owners
the right to file an in rem action against a domain name registrant in any
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. (footnote omitted).
127. See 15 U.S.C. 1125(d)(2) (2012).
128. Id.
129. Kopel, supra note 58, at 863.
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jurisdiction where the “domain name registrar, registry, or other domain
name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located” if the
mark owner cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over the registrant.133
This part first looks at the background of the ACPA and how courts
have applied the law.  Second, it will examine how the Fourth Circuit held
that in rem jurisdiction is not limited to domain names registered in bad
faith.  Finally, this part looks at potential constitutional issues presented by
in rem jurisdiction over foreign–owned domain names.
A. Background of the ACPA
With the advent of the DNS, enterprising individuals quickly realized
the commercial value of domain names.134  Soon enough, domains such as
“sex.com” and “drugs.com” started cropping up on the Internet, even before
there were any legitimate businesses behind the domain names.135  More
problematically, domain names comprised of valuable trademarks were be-
ing registered by parties entirely unrelated with the actual trademark own-
ers.136  Some of these registrants hoped to sell the domain name back to the
trademark owner for a profit, while others purposely misled consumers
“about the source of product or services on the Internet.”137  These practices
eventually became known as “cybersquatting.”138
Trademark owners initially responded by arguing that domain name reg-
istrants were diluting the value of their marks under the Lanham Act.139 The
problem, however, is that trademark law only imposes liability if the alleged
infringer has used the mark in commerce.140  Since many cybersquatters
never sold products or provided services through their domain names, it is
unclear if they used any trademark in commerce.141 There was another prob-
lem as well.  While some trademark owners successfully sued identifiable
registrants in the U.S.,142 this strategy was useless against unidentifiable do-
main name registrants or those beyond the scope of U.S. jurisdiction.143
133. Id.
134. Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet Domain Name System,
4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 149, 151 (2000).
135. Id.; Christine Soares, Are Domain Name Property? The Sex.com Controversy, 2001
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 32 (2001).
136. See, e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Litman,
supra note 134 at 155 (describing how this practice became derisively known as
“cybersquatting”).
137. Lee, supra note 14, at 104.
138. Id. at 105-06.
139. Id.
140. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2012); Litman, supra note 134, at 154.
141. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 134, at 154.
142. See, e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
143. Lee, supra note 14, at 106.
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To get around these obstacles, some trademark owners attempted to pro-
ceed in rem against cybersquatting domain names under the Lanham Act.144
Before the ACPA, these attempts were often unsuccessful.145  For example,
in Porsche Cars v. Porsch.com, the district court dismissed Porsche’s dilu-
tion claim for lack of jurisdiction.146  In that case, Porsche filed an in rem
action against multiple trademark infringing domain names, including
“Porsche.net” and “Porscheclub.net.”147  Rejecting Porsche’s arguments, the
court held that it could only exercise in rem jurisdiction “either (1) if a fed-
eral statute so provides; or (2) if state law so permits and personal jurisdic-
tion over the property owner cannot be had.”148 Accordingly, the court found
that the Lanham Act did not permit in rem actions and the state law did not
recognize claims for trademark dilution.149
In response to cases such as Porsche Cars, Congress passed the Anti-
cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) in 1999.150 The ACPA
amended the Lanham Act so that anyone who registers a domain name to
profit from the goodwill of another’s trademark may be liable for dam-
ages.151 The first section of the ACPA, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1),
creates personal liability against parties who registered trademark infringing
domain names in bad faith.152 Additionally, § 1125(d)(1) articulates a
non–exclusive list of factors to determine whether a domain name was regis-
tered in bad faith.153
Congress also attempted to address domain name registrants who are
outside the reach of U.S. jurisdiction or cannot be located altogether.154 The
ACPA in rem provision, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2), states that
“[t]he owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action against a domain
name in the judicial district in which the domain name registrar, domain
name registry, or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the
domain name is located” if the owner “is not able to obtain in personam
144. See, e.g., Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsch.Com, 51 F. Supp. 2d 707 (E.D. Va.
1999), vacated and remanded sub nom. Porsche Cars N. Am. Inc. v. AllPorsche Com., 215
F.3d 1320 (4th Cir. 2000), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v.
Porsche.net, 302 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2002).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 713.
147. Id. at 709-10.
148. Id. at 711.
149. Id. at 712-13.
150. Lee, supra note 14, at 124 (“In direct response to the district court’s ruling, Porsche
and other prominent trademark holders urged Congress to clarify that in rem jurisdiction is
appropriate in trademark actions against cybersquatters. These efforts culminated in the ‘Anti-
cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act,’ which was signed into law by President Clinton on
November 29, 1999.”).
151. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2012).
152. Id.
153. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i).
154. Id. § 1125(d)(2)(A).
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jurisdiction over a person who would have been a defendant in a civil action
under [§ 1125 (d)(1)].”155  Under this part of the law, a trademark owner
who cannot hale a cybersquatter into court can commence an ex parte pro-
ceeding to cancel the infringing domain name.
American Girl v. Nameview helps illustrate how the ACPA bolstered the
trademark owner’s position against cybersquatters.156  In that case, an un-
known party registered the domain name “amercangirl.com.”157  Although
this domain name appears very similar to the American Girl doll company’s
domain, it actually directed users to a pornographic website instead.158  Un-
derstandably, American Girl sought a temporary restraining order in Wis-
consin against the unknown website operator and its registrar in order to
disable the domain name.159  However, the Wisconsin court declined to grant
the restraining order because the defendants’ only known contact with the
forum state was the website, which was not enough to satisfy the minimum
contacts test.160
Instead of exercising personal jurisdiction, the court recommended that
plaintiffs seek relief at the Eastern District of Virginia under the in rem pro-
vision of the ACPA.161  Had American Girl done so, it could have asked the
Virginia court to compel cancellation of the infringing domain name, regard-
less of whether the court had personal jurisdiction over any of the defend-
ants.162  Recall that registries for each TLD maintain a directory of all
domain names under the TLD.  By far, the most common TLD is “.com,”
which is generally used to designate commercial websites.163  VeriSign Inc.,
the registry for “.com” and “.net,” is based in Virginia.164  Therefore, under
the ACPA, the Eastern District of Virginia could exercise in rem jurisdiction
over the infringing domain name.165
B. In rem Jurisdiction and the Bad Faith Requirement
Although the ACPA clearly covers flagrant cybersquatters such as the
registrant in American Girl, it left some ambiguity regarding the outer limits
of a court’s in rem jurisdiction under the law. In particular, is in rem juris-
155. Id.
156. See Am. Girl, LLC v. Nameview, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 876 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
157. Id. at 878.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 880-81.
161. Id. at 882.
162. Id. at 882-83.
163. As of December 2012, there were 106.2 million domain names ending in “.com,”
out of a total of approximately 252 million domain names. VeriSign, supra note 99, at 2.
164. Am. Girl, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 882.
165. Id.
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diction only available against domain names registered in bad faith?166 Un-
like personal liability under § 1125(d)(1), the in rem provision under
§ 1125(d)(2) does not explicitly contain a bad faith requirement.167  How-
ever, § 1125(d)(2) cross–references “a person who would have been a defen-
dant in a civil action under [§ 1125 (d)(1)].”168  By doing so, it is unclear if
§ 1125(d)(2) also incorporates the bad faith requirement of § 1125(d)(1).
Presented with this ambiguity in Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain
Names, the Fourth Circuit decided the cross–reference simply refers to any
domain name registrant, regardless of whether they are acting in bad faith.169
In Harrods, Harrods Ltd. (Harrods U.K.) sought an order to cancel sixty
domain names registered in Virginia by an Argentinian competitor also
named Harrods (Harrods SA).170  Harrods SA could not be reached by in
personam jurisdiction, so Harrods U.K. relied on in rem jurisdiction.171 Al-
though the district court “limited the scope of the in rem provision to claims
under § 1125(d)(1) for bad faith registration,” the Fourth Circuit reversed
and “ultimately conclude[d] that § 1125(d)(2) is not limited to violations of
§ 1125(d)(1).”172
In overruling the lower court’s findings, the Fourth Circuit held that “the
best interpretation of § 1125(d)(2) is that the in rem provision not only cov-
ers bad faith claims . . . , but also covers infringement claims under § 1114
and § 1125(a) and dilution claims under § 1125(c).”173  Starting with the
statutory language, the court noted that § 1125(d)(2) grants in rem jurisdic-
tion over any “domain name [that] violates any right of the owner of a [pro-
tected] mark.”174  Since “any right” of a mark owner is not limited to rights
under §1125(d)(1), the court held that in rem jurisdiction under § 1125(d)(2)
does not require the mark owner to prove bad faith.175  Turning to the legis-
lative history, the court found that Congress did not frame in rem jurisdiction
“in terms of subsection (d)(1) or bad faith. . . . Rather, it sa[id] the in rem
166. Compare BroadBridge Media, LLC v. Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 511
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that bad faith intent to profit is a necessary element for in rem pro-
ceedings under the ACPA), with Jack In The Box, Inc. v. Jackinthebox.org, 143 F. Supp. 2d
590, 592 (E.D. Va. 2001) (“The plain terms of the statute clearly state that the ‘bad faith’
analysis applies only to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1), the in personam prong, not 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d)(2), the in rem prong.”).
167. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)-(2) (2012).
168. Id. § 1125(d)(2).
169. Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 230 (4th Cir. 2002)
(“[T]he phrase ‘a person who would have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph
(1)’ can fairly be understood as a short-hand reference to the current registrant of the domain
name.”).
170. Id. at 222-23.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 228.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 229.
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action is available for domain names that violate ‘substantive Federal trade-
mark law’ or which are ‘infringing or diluting under the Trademark Act.’”176
As such, the court reasoned that §1125(d)(2) covers a broader range of do-
main names than those registered in bad faith.177 Although Harrods only
represents the Fourth Circuit’s reading of the ACPA, its holding had a broad
impact because some of the world’s most common TLDs are hosted by re-
gistries in Virginia.178 As such, this interpretation allows district courts in
Virginia to exercise in rem jurisdiction over a significant portion of domain
names on the Internet without making a bad faith inquiry, including all do-
main names ending in “.com,” “.net” and “.org.”179
C. In rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Concerns
In light of the ACPA’s broad conferral of jurisdiction over domain
names registered by foreign entities, registrants have also argued that, under
Shaffer, the ACPA in rem provision violates due process because it allows
courts to exercise jurisdiction over parties that lack minimum contacts with
the forum.180  As described previously, Shaffer held that courts cannot use in
rem jurisdiction to run around the minimum contacts requirement.181  In that
case, the Court noted that “in order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in
rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient for ‘jurisdiction over the
interests of persons in a thing.’”182
To date, courts have correctly limited Shaffer to claims that do not in-
volve the attached property, thus holding it inapposite to the exercise of in
rem jurisdiction under the ACPA.183  Unlike the plaintiffs’ claim in Shaffer,
the ACPA expressly precludes any claim that does not involve the domain
name.184  Therefore, all proceedings under § 1125(d)(2) must adjudicate
176. Id. at 231.
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., About Verisign, VERISIGN, http://www.verisigninc.com/en_US/company-
information/index.xhtml (last visited Apr. 16, 2014); Get to know us, PUBLIC INTEREST REGIS-
TRY, http:www.pir.org/about-us/get-to-know-us/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2014).
179. Id.
180. Harrods, 302 F.3d at 224; Cable News Network LP v. CNNews.com, 177 F. Supp.
2d 506 (E.D. Va. 2001), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 56 F. App’x 599 (4th Cir. 2003). This
issue was not lost on Congress when it drafted the ACPA.  During committee hearings for the
bill, Senator Orrin Hatch asked the counsel for Porsche about whether in rem actions against
domain names raised due process concerns.  Counsel replied by arguing that true in rem juris-
diction over domain names does not offend due process even if the registrant is not subject to
personal jurisdiction. Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection: Ensuring Domain Name In-
tegrity: Hearing on S. 1255 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 65–67 (1999)
(statement of Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee).
181. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977).
182. Id.
183. Harrods, 302 F.3d at 224.
184. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2) (2012).
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rights to the disputed property itself.185  For in rem actions under the ACPA,
“the location of the [ ] registry in [a forum] establishes the situs of the [ ]
domain name . . . and thus provides jurisdiction for an in rem action against
the domain name itself in [the forum].”186
Looking at the issue another way, Shaffer reaffirms the minimum con-
tact standard under International Shoe, in which the contact strength needed
to satisfy due process depends on the nature of the underlying dispute.187  In
Shaffer, Delaware’s exercise of jurisdiction would have been proper if the
dispute involved the sequestered stock certificates.188  The contact estab-
lished by the location of the stock certificates would have been sufficient for
disputes closely related to the stocks, but not for disputes unrelated to the
stocks.189  Extending this logic to websites, the situs of the domain name is
strong enough to confer jurisdiction over disputes related to the domain
name, but not disputes unrelated to domain names.  Therefore, exerting in
rem jurisdiction over the domain name comports with the minimum contacts
standard for due process.
Others, however, have argued that ACPA in rem proceedings are incon-
sistent with the existing framework for due process.190 According to this ar-
gument, the ACPA only allows a trademark owner to proceed in rem if she
cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over the domain name registrant.191 In
rem proceedings over domain names effectively adjudicate personal interests
of the registrant, but Shaffer holds that such proceedings are subject to the
same minimum contacts standard as personal jurisdiction.192  Therefore, a
court cannot constitutionally exercise in rem jurisdiction over a domain
name if the court cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over the registrant.193
The registrant in Harrods raised this precise argument, contending that
the Virginia court’s exercise of in rem jurisdiction over its domain name
violated due process because the registrant lacked minimum contacts with
Virginia.194  The court rejected this argument, and looked to dicta in Shaffer
stating that “‘when claims to the property itself are the source of the under-
185. Id.
186. Am. Online, Inc. v. Aol.org, 259 F. Supp. 2d 449, 456-57 (2003).
187. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207.
188. Id. at 207-08.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, In Rem Jurisdiction from Pennoyer to Shaffer to the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 243, 245 (2002); Cath-
erine T. Struve & R. Polk Wagner, Realspace Sovereigns in Cyberspace: Problems with the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 1006 (2002).
191. Struve & Wagner, supra note 190, at 1006-07.
192. Id.
193. Id.; see also Adam M. Greenfield, Reviving the Distinction Between In Rem and In
Personam Jurisdiction by Way of the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 35
AIPLA Q.J. 29, 32-33 (2007).
194. Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 224 (4th Cir. 2002)
(citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 (1977)).
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lying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unu-
sual for the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction.’”195
Since the controversy here “is related to [the registrant’s] rights and duties
arising out of” its ownership of domain names registered in Virginia, a court
in that state has jurisdiction.196
Similarly in Cable News Network v. CNNews.com, the Virginia Court
also exercised in rem jurisdiction over a foreign–owned domain name de-
spite the registrant’s due process objections.197  In that case, the registrant
operated a Chinese language news website under the domain cnnews.com.198
Additionally, the registrant also operated other websites with domain names
starting with “CN,” including “cnnav.com” and “cnsport.com”—all of
which catered to Chinese audiences.199  Believing that Internet users might
attribute the source of cnnews.com to the Cable News Network (CNN),
CNN secured a district court order to transfer cnnews.com from its Chinese
registrant to CNN.200 In response, the registrant protested that transferring its
domain name would “unconstitutionally disrupt[ ] the contract between two
foreign entities [and would be] tantamount to the issuance of an unconstitu-
tional extraterritorial injunction.”201  As in Harrods, the court distinguished
in rem jurisdiction under ACPA from the exercise of jurisdiction in Shaf-
fer.202 Because the dispute was over domain names, “there [was] no require-
ment that the owner or claimant of the res have minimum contacts with the
forum [and] it [was] not necessary that the allegedly infringing registrant
have minimum contacts with the forum.”203  The court emphasized that “due
process is not offended by adjudicating the rights to the cnnews.com domain
name in an ACPA in rem claim where, as here, the domain name certificate
is located in this district.”204
Although in rem jurisdiction under the ACPA comports with the Su-
preme Court’s approach to due process, there is still a separate question of




197. Cable News Network, LP v. CNNews.com, 56 F. App’x 599, 603 (4th Cir. 2003).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Cable News Network LP v. CNNews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506 (E.D. Va. 2001),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 56 F. App’x 599 (4th Cir. 2003).
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IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF IN REM JURISDICTION OVER
DOMAIN NAMES
As Section I notes, jurisdictional principles serve systemic interests, pro-
tect individual liberty, and ensure procedural fairness.205  The Supreme
Court has stressed that any exercise of jurisdiction should be consistent with
these principles and, when necessary, has modified jurisdiction rules so they
continue to serve these policy concerns.206
In looking at the policy implications of the ACPA, it is important to
consider that Congress may have envisioned that jurisdiction under the in
rem provisions would be narrower than its current scope.207  As previously
discussed, the history of the ACPA suggests that it was largely designed to
target cybersquatters who registered trademark infringing domain names.208
Typically, such registrants tried to sell their domain names to the mark’s
owners or purposefully misdirected web users.209  Therefore, cybersquatters
often do not maintain actual webpages or host content that is entirely unre-
lated to the domain name, such as the cybersquatter in American Girl.210  In
these cases, there is a no nexus between the domain name and the underlying
website, and it is sensible to separate the domain name from the underlying
web content for jurisdictional purposes. In other words, the impact of in rem
action is limited to the domain name itself in “true” cybersquatting cases.
In reality, however, parties do not always use the ACPA against “true”
cybersquatters; they also invoke the in rem provision against domain names
owned by legitimate foreign businesses.211  As Cable News demonstrates,
litigants have effectively relied on the ACPA to capture trademark rights in
cyberspace through ex parte proceedings.212  In such cases, the registrants
were not simply cybersquatters who hoped to turn a quick profit by register-
ing someone else’s trademark.  Rather, the disputed domain names were
closely related to the registrant’s underlying web content and business.213  In
this scenario, there is a strong nexus between the domain name and the reg-
istrant’s web content, and it is far less sensible to separate the website from
its domain name for jurisdictional purposes.  Often, the two users of the
mark existed in separate geographic areas until the universal accessibility of
the Internet brought them into conflict.  By exerting in rem jurisdiction over
a disputed domain name, the court effectively determines which party has
205. See supra Part I.C-D.
206. See, e.g., Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186.
207. See supra Part IV.A.
208. H.R. REP. NO. 106-464, at 114 (1999) (Conf. Rep.).
209. See, e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998).
210. Am. Girl, LLC v. Nameview, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 876, 878 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
211. See supra Part IV.A.
212. Cable News Network, LP v. CNNews.com, 56 F. App’x 599, 603 (4th Cir. 2003).
213. For instance, the registrant in Cable News operated multiple websites with domain
names that started with “CN.” Id. at 601.
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the right to use the mark on the Internet to signify their goods and services.
District courts are certainly no stranger to adjudicating trademark disputes,
and they are entirely capable of applying the Lanham Act to the virtual
world.214  The problem, however, is that many cases arising under the ACPA
involve foreign parties that would never be subject to the U.S. trademark law
but for the fact that the dispute involves a domain name.  In other words, the
ACPA allows courts to apply U.S. trademark law to international disputes
between foreign parties.
Such a broad conferral of power undermines the traditional policy ratio-
nale behind jurisdictional limits in two important ways.  First, in rem juris-
diction over domain names allows U.S. courts to overreach into international
and foreign disputes.  Second, ex parte proceedings against domain names
violate party expectations and create unpredictability for businesses.  Given
the problems associated with the current scope of in rem jurisdiction, this
Note argues that courts should require trademark owners to show bad faith
on the part of the registrant before exercising in rem jurisdiction.
A. In rem Jurisdiction Allows U.S. Courts to Overreach into
Foreign Disputes
In rem jurisdiction over domain names is inconsistent with systemic in-
terests for jurisdictional limits because it allows district courts to adjudicate
disputes that, in reality, have little connection to the United States.215 Har-
rods helps illustrate this issue.  In that case, Harrods BA and Harrods U.K.
used the Harrods mark in Argentina and Great Britain independently.216 Al-
though Harrods BA’s registration of multiple domain names may have been
in bad faith, the underlying dispute still involved two foreign companies that
did not have significant contacts with the United States.217  Nonetheless, by
exercising in rem jurisdiction over the domain names, the Eastern District of
Virginia applied U.S. domestic law to adjudicate a dispute between foreign
parties doing business in other countries.
The ACPA in rem provision’s broad extraterritorial reach can also cre-
ate incompatible legal obligations.  For example, in Globalsantafe v. Global-
santafe.com, the Eastern District of Virginia ordered VeriSign to disable a
domain name despite a conflicting order from a foreign court.218  In that
case, GlobalSantaFe filed an in rem action against Globalsantafe.com, a do-
214. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Utah
2010).
215. See, e.g., Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The Digital Trademark Right: A Troubling New
Extraterritorial Reach of United States Law, 81 N.C. L. REV. 483 (2003).
216. Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 220-21 (4th Cir.
2002).
217. Id. at 223.
218. Globalsantafe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610, 612 (E.D. Va.
2003).
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main name registered by Fanmore, a Korean company.219  The domain was
also registered through a Korean registrar.220 The district court ordered Ver-
iSign and the Korean registrar to transfer the domain name to Global-
SantaFe.221  In the meantime, Fanmore convinced a court in Seoul, Korea to
enjoin the Korean registrar from transferring the domain name because Vir-
ginia lacked jurisdiction over the dispute.222 Notwithstanding the foreign in-
junction, the Virginia court nonetheless ordered VeriSign to unilaterally
disable the domain name.223  The court noted the potential international com-
ity issue, but refused to cede jurisdiction because “the foreign proceeding
did not commence until the matter had been fully adjudicated here” and
because “the Korean proceeding was obviously begun with the intent of
blocking the Judgment Order.”224
By creating incompatible legal obligations for entirely foreign parties,
the exercise of in rem jurisdiction over domain names undermines the or-
derly administration of laws.  A state’s sovereign interest in applying its own
laws to its own domiciliaries is a fundamental part of an ordered interna-
tional legal regime and a basic precept of territorialism.225  As such, the Ko-
rean court in Globalsantafe had an interest in adjudicating the rights of
Internet companies based in Korea.  By exercising in rem jurisdiction at the
registry level, however, the U.S. court imposed U.S. trademark law on both
the Korean registrar and the Korean domain name registrant, thus undermin-
ing the Korean court’s ability to regulate conduct in its own borders.
B. In rem Jurisdiction Undermines Individual Interests
In addition to overreaching into foreign disputes, the exercise of in rem
jurisdiction under the ACPA also harms individual interests by undermining
party expectations and creating procedural unfairness for foreign litigants. In
rem jurisdiction undermines party expectations because there is often no re-
lationship between the situs of the domain name and the registrant’s actual
activities.  In establishing a web presence, individuals and companies work
with a number of companies for web–hosting space, domain name registra-
tion, and other services.226  The physical location of each service provider
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 613-14.
222. Id. at 614.
223. Id. 626-27.
224. Id. at 625.
225. Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Fair Play and Substantial Justice?, 63 S.C. L.
REV. 745, 764 (2012).
226. Emma Lunn, Self-Employment: How to Set Up Your Company Website, THE
GUARDIAN (Jul. 22, 2011, 6:01 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/money/2011/jul/22/self-em-
ployment-set-up-website.
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usually has little impact on the website’s functionality or accessibility.227
This is especially true for the DNS, where the registry’s location is largely
meaningless from a practical standpoint.  Likewise, generic TLDs such as
“.com,” and “.org” are fairly perceived as independent of any geographic
territory.  Many non–U.S. websites that exclusively target non–U.S. audi-
ences use the “.com” TLD because it is perceived more favorably by con-
sumers, regardless of geographic location.228
Given the lack of connection between the location of the registry and a
company’s online activities, registrants should not reasonably expect to de-
fend their rights in a foreign forum simply because their domain name ends
in “.com.” Cable News helps illustrate this issue. In that case, the Chinese
registrant of cnnews.com operated a series of websites with domain names
that ended in “.com.”229  All of the websites provided Chinese language con-
tent, targeted Chinese web users, and only accepted payment from China.230
The content of the website, along with any potential trademark infringement,
bore no relationship with the physical location of the “.com” registry. In
other words, the registry’s location was inconsequential before CNN sued.
Accordingly, it is hard to imagine that the Chinese registrant could have
foreseen being haled into a Virginia court. By forcing the registrant to liti-
gate in Virginia, the court imposed the hardships of litigating in a foreign
forum on a party that had little reason to expect trial in the U.S.231  This
practice likewise erodes the legal predictability that businesses need to struc-
ture their online conduct.
Even assuming that registrants should foresee U.S. litigation for a
“.com” domain name, defining the situs of a domain name by the location of
the registry is still procedurally unfair for non–U.S. registrants.  Under the
ACPA, a foreign registrant is forced to choose between using non–U.S.
based TLDs or face potential litigation in a U.S. court.232  The problem is
that the “.com” TLD, which is based in Virginia, remains the gold standard
227. See, e.g., The Domain Name System: A Non-Technical Explanation – Why Univer-
sal Resolvability Is Important, INTERNIC, http://www.internic.net/faqs/authoritative-dns.html
(last visited Nov. 24, 2013). But see John Mueller, Working with Multi-regional Websites,
GOOGLE WEBMASTER CENTRAL BLOG (Mar. 12, 2010, 7:50 AM), http://googlewebmastercen-
tral.blogspot.com.es/2010/03/working-with-multi-regional-websites.html (explaining that the
location of the webhosting server may impact how Google indexes the websites for geo-target-
ing services).
228. See, e.g., Bob Cullinan, .com, .net, .biz. . .Is There a Difference? Perception Says
Yes, the Survey Says No; Lexicon Branding Survey Looks at the Real Differences in Internet
Names, BUS. WIRE (Mar. 17, 2006, 6:01 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/
20060316005223/en/.com-.net-.biz. . .Is-Difference-Perception-Survey-Lexicon.
229. Cable News Network, LP v. CNNews.com, 56 F. App’x 599, 601 (4th Cir. 2003).
230. Id.
231. Cf. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (noting
the “unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system”).
232. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (2012).
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for commercial domain names.233  Consumers often perceive “.com” web-
sites to be more reliable or trustworthy.234  By giving in rem jurisdiction to
the forum where the registry is located, the ACPA makes consent to Virginia
jurisdiction and U.S. trademark law a condition to using the world’s most
recognizable TLD.  This imposes a much greater burden on non–U.S. web-
site operators, who must resort to less attractive TLDs or face exposure to
liability in a foreign legal system.
V. RECONSIDERING THE BAD FAITH REQUIREMENT FOR IN
REM JURISDICTION
Rather than exercising in rem jurisdiction over any trademark infringing
domain name, courts should only proceed in rem when it determines that a
domain name was registered in a bad faith attempt to profit from a protected
trademark.  As previously discussed, there is a distinction between cyber-
squatters and foreign registrants who happen to use the same mark as an-
other company to denote their products.  In the former, in rem jurisdiction
impacts fewer personal rights because cybersquatters do not use the domain
name as a gateway for a related online business.  Nevertheless, instead of
limiting in rem jurisdiction to this purpose, courts have allowed litigants to
invoke the ACPA in all trademark litigation over domain names.  By doing
so, U.S. courts effectively exert power over entirely foreign disputes and
extend the Lanham Act to parties with little U.S. connection.  This is a
deeply problematic extraterritorial application of U.S. law.
To correct this overextension of U.S. jurisdiction, this Note proposes
that courts should limit in rem jurisdiction to domain names that were regis-
tered in bad faith, as defined by the factors under § 1125(d)(1).  The purpose
of these factors is precisely to separate cybersquatters from foreign busi-
nesses who happen to infringe trademarks through their domain name.235
Incorporating this standard into the in rem provision will allow U.S. courts
to continue protecting mark owners against domain names that are registered
solely to extort value from businesses, but limit the role of U.S. courts in
international trademark disputes involving legitimate online activity by for-
eign companies.  For example, under the proposed interpretation, a Virginia
Court could still exercise jurisdiction over “amercangirl.com” because the
233. See, e.g., Kyle Eslick, Why Dot Com Domains are the Gold Standard, SLICKAF-
FILIATE http://slickaffiliate.com/why-dot-com-domains-are-the-gold-standard (last visited Nov.
30, 2013); Adam Grunwerg, Why New Top-Level Web Domains are Doomed to Fail, THE
GUARDIAN, (Feb, 12, 2013, 11:33 AM) http://www.theguardian.com/media-network/media-
network-blog/2013/feb/12/icanns-gtlds-internet-domain-name.
234. T. Halvorson et al., The BIZ Top-Level Domain: Ten Years Later, 7192 PASSIVE &
ACTIVE MEASUREMENT LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCI. 221, 221 (2012) (“To the average
user, com became synonymous with the Web, its iconic status earning it a place in the Oxford
English Dictionary in 1994.”).
235. See e.g. H.R. Rep. No. 106-412, at 10-13 (1999); H.R. Rep. No. 106-140, at 8-9
(1999).
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domain name was likely registered in bad faith.236  However, if Cable News
was decided under the proposed interpretation, the Virginia court would
likely not have jurisdiction over cnnews.com because the domain name did
not appear to have been registered in a bad faith attempt to profit from the
CNN mark.237  Rather, cnnews.com was part of a whole series of websites
starting with “CN,” and likely constituted an important part of the regis-
trant’s virtual presence.  Such cases involve issues of substantive trademark
law and would be more appropriately adjudicated by the forum where the
registrant directs her online activity, rather than the forum where her domain
name happens to be registered.
To reach this outcome, courts must revisit the Fourth Circuit’s interpre-
tation of the ACPA in rem provision in Harrods.238  In that case, the court
held that § 1125(d)(2) did not incorporate a bad faith requirement after ana-
lyzing the statutory text and its legislative history.239  However, neither the
text of the ACPA, nor its legislative history, mandates such an interpretation.
Rather, a better reading of § 1125(d)(2) would limit the in rem provision to
domain names registered in bad faith.
Starting with the statutory text, § 1125(d)(2) imposes two independent
conditions for an in rem action under the ACPA.  Under the first subsection,
the “domain name [must] violate[ ] [a] right of the owner of a mark regis-
tered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or protected under subsection (a)
or (c) of [§ 1125].”240  This first condition defines the substantive trademark
rights that may be enforced through an in rem action.  Under the second
subsection, the court must find that the trademark owner cannot “obtain in
personam jurisdiction over a person who would have been a defendant in a
civil action under paragraph (1); or . . . through due diligence was not able to
find a person who would have been a defendant in a civil action under para-
graph (1) . . . .”241  This second condition limits the in rem action to a spe-
cific subset of trademark infringing domain names, namely those registered
by someone who “would have been a defendant under [§ 1125(d)(1)].”242
236. Applying the bad faith factors in § 1125(d)(1), “amercangirl.com” appears to have
been registered with “intent to divert consumers from the mark owner’s online location to a
site accessible under the domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by the
mark. . .” Additionally, the registrant of “amercangirl.com” also provided “material and mis-
leading false contact information when applying for the registration of the domain name.” Am.
Girl, LLC v. Nameview, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 876, 878 (E.D. Wis. 2005); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d)(1).
237. Cable News Network, LP v. CNNews.com, 56 F. App’x 599 (4th Cir. 2003).
238. Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 2002).
239. Id. at 232 (interpreting the Senate Report to suggest that Congress intended the in
rem provision to apply to domain names that violate any substantive federal trademark law,
regardless of whether the domain name was registered by a cybersquatter).
240. 15 U.S.C. §1125(d)(1) (2012).
241. Id. § 1125(d)(2).
242. Id.
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Roughly speaking, the first condition defines what rights are enforceable,
while the second condition defines who may be subject to such enforcement.
Instead of analyzing these conditions separately, the Fourth Circuit ap-
peared to conflate two subsections that independently limit in rem jurisdic-
tion.  The court recognized that the first subsection “identifies the
substantive rights actionable under the in rem provision” while the second
subsection “deals with the proper defendant to a cybersquatting claim.”243
Nevertheless, the court held that a bad faith requirement would create “ten-
sion between this language and subsection (d)(2)(A)(i)’s broad language of
“‘any right of the owner of a mark.’”244  It is not clear why this tension
would preclude a bad faith requirement if the two conditions are read inde-
pendently. Even if in rem actions can be used to enforce any federal trade-
mark right, it is still perfectly rational to impose a separate limitation on the
class of domain names subject to in rem jurisdiction through a bad faith
requirement.
Turning to the legislative history, it appears that Congress deliberately
tried to avoid creating liability for domain names registered in good faith,
even if the domain names infringe federal trademark rights.  In a House of
Representatives Report, Congress stated that the ACPA “does not extend . . .
to someone who is aware of the trademark status of the name but registers a
domain name containing the mark for any reason other than with bad faith
intent to profit from the goodwill associated with the mark.”245 Likewise
during debates, Senator Leahy emphasized that “[t]he mere presence of a
trademark is not enough” to trigger liability under the ACPA.246  He goes on
to state that “legitimate conflicts may arise between companies offering dif-
ferent services or products under the same trademarked name . . . . There is a
world of difference between these sorts of sites and those which use decep-
tive naming practices to draw attention to their sites.”247  Later, he repeated
that “it is important [to] distinguish between the legitimate and illegitimate
use of domain names, and this legislation does just that.”248  Unfortunately,
by leaving out the bad faith requirement from the in rem provision, courts
that interpret the ACPA no longer make such a distinction.  As such, the
ACPA has become another tool for enforcing trademark rights against legiti-
mate businesses—the precise outcome that Congress hoped to avoid.  Given
this legislative history, courts should adhere to the most natural interpreta-
tion of the ACPA and limit in rem jurisdiction to domain names that were
registered in bad faith.
243. Harrods, 302 F.3d at 230.
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CONCLUSION
As the Internet ties together more nations and communities, there will
be inevitable conflicts over the rights to use valuable marks in cyberspace.
By exercising in rem jurisdiction over a substantial portion of the DNS, U.S.
courts encroach upon foreign sovereignty, undermine the ability of compa-
nies to structure their conduct, and create procedural unfairness for foreign
website operators.  Even if such an exercise of jurisdiction comports with
due process, courts should still take steps to limit their exercise of in rem
jurisdiction to cybersquatting cases, instead of using it as a means to adjudi-
cate the substantive rights of foreign parties.  To do so, courts should only
exercise in rem jurisdiction over domain names registered in bad faith. Such
restraint will help ensure that the Internet continues to drive global entrepre-
neurship and development.
